Self-deception in coaches: An issue in principle and a challenge for supervision by Bachkirova, Tatiana
 1 
Self-deception in coaches: an issue in principle and a challenge for supervision 
 
Tatiana Bachkirova, Oxford Brookes University, UK 
 
Abstract 
This article describes an exploratory study aimed at investigating factors contributing 
to the phenomenon of self-deception in coaches. Six experienced coaching supervisors 
were interviewed in accordance with the Conceptual Encounter research 
methodology. The results are presented in a model of self-deception in coaches. The 
model consists of three main sections, which include the nature of self-deception, 
contextual influences on self-deception and the focused influence on self-deception in 
coaching supervision. These themes are discussed in light of the structural analysis of 
the literature on self-deception performed from a pragmatic perspective. The paper 
concludes by considering how the results of the study add to current debates on the 
nature of self-deception and what implications the findings might have for coaches, 
coaching supervisors and other practitioners engaged in the development of 
individuals in organisations.  
Practice points 
• This article is relevant to all types of coaching and particularly to coaching 
supervision. 
• The article addresses the issue of self-deception of coaches that highlights the 
role of the practitioner’s self in the coaching process and the potential 
implications of this phenomenon on the quality of practice. 
• The findings raise coaches’ awareness of their self-deception and how to 
address it. Coaching supervisors and educators should be able to inform their 
practice using the proposed model. 
 
Introduction 
Coaching is about change, improvement and development; however, experienced 
coaches and coaching supervisors admit that self-deception can be an obstacle to this 
processes. Both of them also observe that self-deception is widespread not only 
among clients but also with coaches. Discussions about phenomena such as self-
deception are usually challenging because discourses of coaching are strongly 
influenced by positive psychology and the term itself may seem judgmental to some 
people. However, concerns about the quality of the coaching process make this topic 
important for practice. The practitioners of this field are aware that their clients ‘filter 
information for personal reasons’ (this is one of the ways to describe self-deception) 
and act accordingly. For example, they may adopt false valuations of their actions and 
abilities in order to boost their self-esteem thus enhancing their sense of happiness 
and creating a desired impression on others. Coaches usually adopt various strategies 
to help their clients to improve their quality of perception in order for them to engage 
with their environment in the most effective way and fulfil their realistic expectations.  
However, coaches themselves are not immune from self-deception and may be 
missing many signs of their own self-deception involved in self-evaluation and their 
actions in coaching practice. The consequences of self-deception of coaches might be 
costly for them and their clients; for example, if a client’s situation is seen through the 
filter of the coach’s own insecurities and other personal motives their capacity to fulfil 
the coaching task of expanding the client’s awareness is limited. Coaches may see 
patterns in clients’ behaviour and stories where there are none and base their logic of 
interventions on these patterns, which may lead nowhere. By colluding with an 
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individual client they might do a disservice to the organisation’s interests. By 
deluding themselves about the quality of their work they might fail to develop the 
coaching engagement appropriately or refer a client on to another specialist when 
necessary.  
It seems reasonable for coaches to wish to become more aware of their own 
self-deception in order to help their clients minimise it. Coaching supervision is one 
of the ways to engage with this difficult task as it aims to enhance the quality of 
coaching practice (Hawkins and Smith, 2013; Bachkirova, et al, 2011). However, the 
functions of supervision can also be affected by the self-deception of coaches. Self-
deception may be an obstacle for reviewing practice in terms of quality and ethics – 
the relevant material may not reach supervision at all. For the developmental function 
of supervision, which is concerned with helping coaches to reflect on their practice 
and themselves as practitioners, self-deception may also be an obstacle if important 
aspects of these are filtered. Therefore, there is a clear interest in understanding how 
and why coaches deceive themselves and how the self-deception of coaches can be 
minimised in principle and through the use of supervision. 
Although extensive, the literature on self-deception does not help for the 
above purposes. The concept of self-deception is still a subject of debate and the 
authors seem to be focused on the conceptual understanding of this phenomenon 
rather than on the implications of it for everyday life (von Hippel and Trivers, 2011; 
Clegg & Moissinac, 2005). In applied disciplines, however, very little attention has 
been paid to the manifestation of this phenomenon in spite of the obvious 
consequences of it on practice. There is no literature on self-deception in coaching 
that explores this phenomenon and very little has been published in the field of 
counselling/psychotherapy (Kirby, 2003; Cooper, 2005; Westland and Shinebourne, 
2009). The research on self-deception is limited (e.g. Gur and Sackheim, 1979; Lee 
and Klein, 2002) and is exclusively concerned with exploring this phenomenon from 
the third person perspective – from the observer positions using purposefully designed 
questionnaires. There are only a few attempts to consider this phenomenon from the 
position of those who experience self-deception or help others exploring similar 
experiences (Westland and Shineboune, 2009).  
Therefore, the purpose of this research was exactly this: to explore self-
deception from the position of those who are interested in self-deception for the 
pragmatic purpose of minimising this phenomenon in coaches. This exploratory study 
aims to identify how coaching supervisors conceptualise self-deception in coaches; 
how they identify self-deception in their practice; what they see as factors 
contributing to the self-deception of coaches in the state of coaching as a professional 
field and what their views are on the potential interventions that could affect self-
deception in coaches. 
 
Literature review 
…one great thing that psychology has achieved is documenting the 
human propensity for self-deception, self-serving biases, cognitive 
dissonance, and defence mechanisms of the ego - the source of much of 
the complexity, and tragedy, of human life ( S. Pinker, 2008, p. 184). 
The extant literature on self-deception reveals the enormously rich field of very 
diverse types of explanations and theories of self-deception. Self-deception is studied 
in philosophy and psychoanalysis, neuroscience and cognitive psychology; 
evolutionary and social psychology (Rorty, 1994; Fingarette, 1998, 2000; Goleman, 
1997; Mele, 2001; Vaillant, 2005; Festinger, 1957; Trivers, 2000; von Hippel 
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and Trivers, 2011). However, interdisciplinary reviews of this literature are extremely 
rare (Fingarette, 2000).  The focus of the literature is still on understanding the main 
paradox: how the same person at the same time can both know and keep oneself from 
knowing the same thing. The complexity of this task is aggravated by the existence of 
many similar concepts, such as information-processing biases, defence mechanisms, 
faulty thinking, cognitive dissonance, and wishful thinking. Some terms from the 
more popular literature such as ‘wishful blindness’ also add to the confusion of 
practitioners interested in this phenomenon. It would require a separate paper to make 
a detailed differentiation of self-deception from all other phenomena. Von Hippel 
and Trivers (2011) for example, make a good case in arguing that self-deception is an 
umbrella term for all biased information processing and includes other types apparent 
at different stages of this process: biased information search strategies, biased 
interpretation and biased memory processes. Although self-deception as a term may 
cause a strong reaction, this paper is aimed at considering the self-deception of 
coaches rather any other concepts for a number of reasons. First of all, this concept is 
widely discussed in the literature that stems from the previous century to the work of 
current commentators. Secondly, it received attention from a wider array of 
perspectives than any other concepts of similar nature. Thirdly, this concept is most 
inclusive as Van Hippel and Trivers (2011) show and there is an agreement on 
specific cases that are considered as classic cases of self-deception, which has not 
been made apparent in relation to other concepts. Finally, I believe that we as coach 
should not shy away from this concept however unpleasant it might sound, if 
exploring it can help in improving the quality of our practice. 
At the same time, suggesting a universal definition of self-deception is a tall 
order because of the variety of philosophical positions that can be taken on this 
concept. In order to provide a working definition of self-deception for this paper the 
following is a summary of what is considered by various authors (e.g. Fingarette, 
2000; Rorty, 1994; Mele, 2001) as conditions for calling a phenomenon a self-
deception: a) a person holds a belief that contradicts the information/knowledge that 
he/she possesses at the same time (Demos, 1960); b) this belief is persistent and the 
person motivated/has a reason to keep it (Gur & Sackeim, 1979; Fingarette, 2000); c) 
the person is acting in ways that keep him/her uninformed about unwanted 
information (Bandura, 2011); d) unacknowledged information is verifiable 
(Lewis,1996). The latter condition is the most controversial leading to many debates 
in philosophy and psychology. 
In spite of the variety of perspectives on self-deception it is possible to 
identify some agreements in the literature – they are mainly represented by two 
general themes. The first is that self-deception is not a simple misperception or 
cognitive error and that “people favour welcome over unwelcome information in a 
manner that reflects their goals or motivations” (Von Hippel and Trivers, 2011) - 
there is something to gain for self-deceivers in terms of things that matter to them 
(e.g. Rorty, 1994; Kurzban, 2010). An example of self-deception, even before 
perception or cognition are involved, would be when we stop gathering information, 
being happy with early return, thus preventing receiving new information (Ditto and 
Lopez, 1992). The second theme is about some obvious costs of self-deception such 
as the repetition of experiences, loss of information integrity and diminished self-
understanding. The cost of self-deception may include situations when people are 
misled by self-deceivers as self-deception makes deception more convincing (e.g. 
Von Hippel and Trivers, 2011; Frost et al, 2001).  
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There are also themes that are much less explored in the literature. Amongst 
them is the theme of individual differences in self-deception. In some psychological 
studies the tendency for self-deception is measured as an individual characteristic 
(Sackheim, 1983; Jamner and Schwartz, 1986), however, as it is claimed to be a stable 
characteristic (Lee & Klein, 2002) it has little value for practitioners interested in 
helping people change. Another less developed theme in the literature is the potential 
approaches for influencing self-deception that can be useful for applied fields such as 
counselling, coaching and education (Kirby, 2003; Cooper, 2005; Westland and 
Shinebourne, 2009). Although there are rich and interesting explanations and theories 
of self-deception, very few of them lead to implications for practitioners working with 
individuals who wish to minimise self-deception.   
As this paper approaches the topic of self-deception from the pragmatic 
position to understand self-deception for applied purposes, the literature review is 
summarised in a structured way to elicit the implication of each position for practice 
with my personal interpretation and in some cases, speculation and critique. The 
following table represents the most distinct theoretical positions on self-deception 
with a view to show how self-deception is conceptualised, if and how self-deception 
can be addressed/changed, how this process can be influenced, and finally what 
potential problems might be anticipated with each position. Although the brevity of 
such a form does not give justice to each position, it is designed to serve as a starting 
point for discussion that will follow the findings of this research. 
 
 
Perspectives on 
self-deception 
(SD) 
Concept of SD How to 
minimise SD 
How to help 
those who wish 
to minimise SD 
Potential problems of this 
approach to helping 
Existentialism 
(Sartre, 1956; 
Kierkegaard, 
1959) 
‘Bad faith’ – SD 
is a disavowal of 
responsibility for 
some projects of 
consciousness 
and consequent 
actions. 
Self-deceivers 
must accept their 
lack of moral 
courage in order 
to act in good 
faith. 
Pointing out SD 
when it is not 
seen. Direct 
appeal for 
integrity and 
intellectual 
growth. 
The role of consciousness and 
intellect in changing 
behaviour is overestimated. 
Understanding does not 
guarantee overcoming. 
Appeals to integrity tend to 
strengthen SD as only a 
person who has integrity 
cares to self-deceive. 
Psychoanalytic 
approach 
(Freud, 
1930/1962, 
1957) 
SD is a defence 
mechanism – 
mental processes 
that operate 
unconsciously to 
reduce painful 
emotions. 
Developing a 
strong ego that 
can withstand 
anxiety and cope 
with becoming 
conscious about 
painful events 
that were 
repressed. 
Re-evaluation of 
threatening 
situations in the 
context of 
supportive 
compassionate 
relationship. 
Defence mechanisms 
represent only one type of SD 
that is triggered by fear and 
serves as a protection from 
anxiety. SD can also be for a 
gain and therefore may need a 
different strategy. 
Postmodernism 
(e.g. Gergen, 
1985; Lewis, 
1996) 
SD is a special 
case of 
storytelling –
immersions in 
one particular 
story that 
excludes some 
experiences. 
Nothing could be 
done on the 
individual scale 
as meaning is 
created through 
processes that 
are largely 
unconscious. 
SD is a cultural 
rather than a 
natural 
phenomenon 
and only can be 
affected in 
response to 
cultural changes. 
This view does not explain 
how individuals who wish to 
see things as clear as possible, 
can recognise SD. There is 
evidence that the nature of SD 
can change on the individual 
level even when cultural 
situations remains largely the 
same. 
The evolutionary 
approach 
(e.g. Von Hippel 
SD is offensive 
rather than 
defensive. It is 
As SD seems to 
have adaptive 
value there is no 
As natural 
selection doesn’t 
care about the 
It seems that that this position 
is relevant only for the 
reproductive stage of human 
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& Trivers, 2011) used to better 
conceal deception 
about one’s 
qualities and thus 
gain evolutionary 
advantage. 
need to minimise 
it. Only a 
balance with 
veridical 
perception 
matters. 
truth only about 
reproductive 
success, helping 
individuals may 
focus also only 
on balance. 
life. However, with a longer 
life span conditions of 
engaging with others can be 
seen in a different light. 
Advocated balance also 
seems arbitrary (20/80). 
Neuroscientists’ 
position 
(e.g. Kenrick & 
White, 2011; 
Kurzban, 2010; 
Huang & Bargh, 
2011; 
Gazzaniga, 
1985, 1992) 
There is no SD as 
there is no self to 
be deceived. It is 
only a division of 
labour between 
different mental 
modules. 
As there is no 
deception - just 
selectivity, the 
only strategy is 
to observe one’s 
behaviours and 
adapt to the way 
things are. 
No suggestions 
are offered for 
influencing SD 
as all potential 
influences may 
be seen as 
moralistic 
devices. 
Although an interesting 
explanation, it leaves too 
many questions unanswered, 
e.g. which mental modules 
have awareness of other 
mental modules when the 
person identifies SD? How 
can it happen? And many 
other questions. 
 
Table 1  Self-deception literature from the pragmatic perspective 
 
 
An overview of the theories of self-deception in Table 1 shows how different the 
perspectives on self-deception can be, making it difficult to inform practitioners’ 
thinking and potential interventions. It also shows that these differences follow from 
the deeper ontological positions of the authors of these theories on what they mean by 
self, truth and reality. Very often these positions are not explicit. The presented 
perspectives are also theory driven rather than informed by the views of interested 
practitioners who might be engaged with this phenomenon and are in a position to 
influence the development and well-being of individuals. 
 
Methodology 
This exploratory study is aimed at in-depth investigation of the psychological 
phenomenon of self-deception in coaches, the factors that may contribute to it and the 
potential consequences. It is approached by engaging with reflections on the 
experiences and the meanings attributed to these by experienced coaching 
supervisors. The project is conceived from the hermeneutic perspective 
acknowledging the role of social construction in the perception and experience of self-
deception. The specific methodological approach adopted for the study was the 
‘Conceptual Encounter’ (De Rivera, 1981) that allows for the presence and influence 
of the researcher by explicitly exposing her assumptions to challenges and 
modifications by the research participants in the process of abstract conceptualisation 
of the phenomenon.  
The methodology involves: 
• Development of the initial model of self-deception in coaching by the 
researcher 
• Interview of each participant about their encounters with self-deception  
• Participant’s contribution to the model of self-deception that is modified after 
each interview as the result of this process with a previous participant 
• Analysis and interpretation of all data through themes and modification of the 
model 
• Description of the cumulative model of self-deception that integrates 
experiences and views discussed throughout the process. 
The challenge of the study was to illuminate the relationship between the construction 
of self-deception in the current social, cultural and professional context and the 
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phenomenon as experienced. It was important therefore to select research participants 
who were reflexive and experienced in observing psychological nuances of relevant 
behaviours in themselves and other people, but also sufficiently informed about the 
contextual issues involved in the phenomenon in question.  To fulfil these 
requirements very experienced coaching supervisors were chosen as research 
participants. The job of coaching supervisors involves helping coaches to reflect on, 
make sense of and respond appropriately to various complex situations in their 
practice. Under the condition of the professional contract and developed trust in the 
relationship, supervisors help coaches to process many issues of engagement with 
their clients and attend to the developmental needs of coaches. This allows 
supervisors to have a unique ‘insider’ view of various coaching issues. At the same 
time, being experienced coaches themselves and caring about the health of the 
profession, supervisors are in a position to relate these issues to the wider context of 
coaching.  
Six supervisors were invited to take part in the interview about their 
experiences and views on self-deception in coaching and in their supervision of other 
coaches. Four male and two female participants were all between 46 and 62 years old 
and had more than 20 years of  experience as coaches and over 7 years as supervisors. 
All supervisors were based in the United Kingdom but worked as coaches and 
supervisors internationally. 
The preliminary questions for the semi-structured interview were sent to 
participants prior to the interview in order to give further orientation to the structure 
of the process. In-depth interview with coaching supervisors was chosen as the 
method of data collection in order to make the best possible use of their capacity to 
take a wider reflective stance on coaching practice together with appreciating the 
individual experiences of coaches. Permission was sought to audio-record interviews 
for the accuracy of the analysis. During the one-to-one interviews (approximately 1 – 
1.5 hours long) the supervisors were asked to describe experiences of what they 
considered to be examples of self-deception in themselves (when acting as coaches) 
and in the coaches they supervise. They were also involved in a discussion on how 
they saw the pertinence of this topic for the coaching field and eventually - their 
strategies for working with these issues in their supervision practice.  
During the interview, participants were also invited to accept, reject or add to 
the elements of the conceptual model of self-deception in coaching, which was 
initially created by the researcher and then modified after the input was provided by 
each of the previous participants. This initial model of self-deception of coaches was 
created on the basis of the literature review together with the personal observations 
and views of the researcher – also an experienced supervisor. This model allowed my 
views on self-deception to be present but not to influence the process subconsciously. 
I was explicit about the model being a product of each consecutive participant and 
that I had no invested interest in any part of it. As a result the final model had very 
little resemblance to the initial one. 
In working towards a model of self-deception, the intention of the analysis of 
data was not to develop a coherent understanding of the experiences and positions on 
self-deception of each participant but rather to refine the concepts involved in 
describing self-deception in coaching using their unique contributions. The analysis of 
data was conducted after each interview to integrate into the model new examples of 
self-deception and the actual suggestions for modification of the emerging model. 
When there was a discrepancy between the participants’ positions I was looking to 
identify a higher order concept that would integrate these different positions. The 
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process of arriving at a model of self-deception in coaches included several iterations 
after each interview. Initially the model grew into a large detailed map that was 
divided at one stage into three different sub maps. Then it became one highly 
structured map that emphasised essential elements from this collaborative process, 
which was eventually transformed as a result of the final analysis into a model of self-
deception in coaches described in Figure 1. According to the chosen methodology the 
involvement of new participants and consequent analysis stopped when no new 
themes were emerging from the consequent interviews and the model became clear 
and ‘elegant’ (De Rivera, 1981).  
In the following section the themes that constitute the final model of self-
deception in coaches are described supported by the actual words of the participants 
describing their experiences and thought processes in relation to the issue of self-
deception. 
 
Results 
The final model (Fig. 1) consists of three main sections: 
• The nature of self-deception  
• Contextual influences on self-deception 
• Focused influence on self-deception through coaching supervision. 
 
Figure 1 here 
 
The nature of self-deception  
The participants did not hesitate to provide examples of self-deception in coaches they 
supervise and their own when acting as coaches. Even without asking for a definition 
it appeared that the concept made sense and was recognised as part of being human. 
The examples of behavioural manifestations of self-deception included overstepping 
the boundaries of coaching when clients wished to work on issues more appropriate 
for therapy; pushing the client too much for their own reasons; ignoring ethical 
dilemmas; colluding with powerful clients. Here is an example of self-deception 
recognised with hindsight by the participant in the role of coach who was 
overestimating his ability to work with an apparent value conflict: 
…the client’s value base was well outside of what I do, but hell, I’m a 
professional, I should be able to do that, to maintain the distance etc. … What the 
effect of it was that actually the client was led to believe that the coach shared 
their views, because there was never any challenge of those views, because the 
coach was so busy protecting this notion that “I can work with it, it’s ok”. (John) 
Some participants were explicit about the widespread nature of this phenomenon 
providing an explanation for this on the conceptual level:  
If we take into consideration that conscious awareness is only a tiny portion of 
what the whole organism can register then self-deception could be taken as a 
description of a natural limitation of consciousness. Self-deception can be seen 
…as a spectrum: at one end are those things that we could easily see if we chose 
to attend to them or if we made them more important or if we dealt with some of 
our own issues, through to the other end of something which would be profoundly 
difficult to see, because it’s at an unconscious or even neurological level. (Nick) 
The participants agreed that self-deception is often driven by fear or gain.  These 
were discovered as roots of self-deception in the process of supervision. The most 
typical of gains recognised by the participants in this regard were the need to feel 
successful and the importance of keeping the contract: 
 8 
I can deceive myself that I’m doing this because my client is not fulfilling their 
potential. Therefore I need to help them be more ambitious. …actually it’s my 
need to have a client that is more successful so that I can feel that my coaching is 
more worthwhile and I feel I can make a difference. (Paul) 
 
…if I don’t want to work with what they want to work with, it is against my 
interests and so I do accept that work. (Bill) 
A typical example of fear at the root of self-deception was a fear of rejection by the 
client:  
…from being a very strong powerful woman [she changed]… to a sense that she 
was the helpful daughter, for whom the approval of the chief exec was very 
important. …she would be talking about how important it was to get this right 
and so that would be the conscious part. The unconscious part was, I think, fear 
of rejection, because I think it is one of the things that all coaches have to face 
reasonably regularly. (Paul)  
At the same time participants recognised that although self-deception is not unusual 
for all human beings it can change as a result of development. 
Her self-awareness has really increased and her willingness to disclose her own 
vulnerability and acknowledge that it’s ok to not know. (Linda)  
Some participants speculated that self-deception might be associated with a 
developmental capacity that takes time to develop:  
…if someone is looking at something from a later stage they will see things that it 
is unlikely that a second person operating at an earlier stage of development will 
see… It is less that they are actively deceiving themselves and more that they 
have yet to develop the ability to see these things. (Nick) 
 
Influences on self-deception  
Although self-deception was recognised by the participants as an individual 
phenomenon it has also been seen in relation to wider contexts. The influences on 
self-deception in coaches are described in the model in two sections: the influences 
from various contexts that tend to increase self-deception on the individual level and 
the active, focused influencing of self-deception in the process of coaching 
supervision when it is purposefully addressed. 
 
Contextual influences  
The first theme of this section of the model is not about specific contextual factors but 
about potential blindness to organisational or personal context that in itself can be 
seen as a factor that increases self-deception in coaches. The individual-focused 
nature of coaching may lead to coaches decontextualizing the client or not seeing 
themselves as part of the contextual field they explore. If the first can be rectified by 
paying attention to the context of the client, the second may not be easily available for 
correction. In the following example the supervisor describes how the coach was 
blind to her personal context that was affecting her work with the client: 
When I challenged her and we explored it, she of course acknowledged it, but she 
didn’t want to, because she had some historical stuff around organisations and 
actually had come out of organisational life not being comfortable. (Linda) 
Without acknowledging one’s own background contribution to the coaching process 
the coach may remain unaware of how contaminated her interpretations might be, as 
argued by another participant:  
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We say: an angry client came into the room. Well, it is you who brings that, the 
angry client doesn’t come into the room, that’s the interpretation that we brought 
in. A part of the process of undeceiving, uncovering is to understand it and see the 
contextual field of which you are part. (Paul) 
However, the process of ’undeceiving’ is complicated because we are also influenced 
by coaching nature and discourses. Participants provided many examples of external 
factors that contribute to self-deception in coaches. One of these factors is the actual 
nature of coaching that may be associated with a position of authority with respect to 
their clients.  
It is then easy to think that, because the client may be being very appreciative 
about the coaching that you’re doing, you’re more than what you are in terms of 
your ability. It’s in the nature of the coaching relationship that there is a pull 
towards becoming somewhat over-inflated and seeing oneself as more than you 
are. (Nick)  
One of the consequences of such over-inflation is reluctance to subject your practice 
for supervision, to learn and to question oneself:  
…some people going to coaching, because they have perhaps some natural ability, 
[then] they have a sort of resistance to actually going along the path of being a 
novice. I don’t think that you get that in the same way in therapy training. … 
…something about the notion of coaching that …makes it seem like it is something 
you get much quicker. (Louise) 
Another feature of coaching that was indicated by the participants as an influencing 
factor in the self-deception in coaches was the significant role played by the Positive 
Psychology discourse (Freire, 2013). Participants expressed concern about strong 
claims that this approach is the most appropriate theoretical foundation of coaching. 
Accepting this view may impose unrealistic expectations on coaches which in turn 
may lead to self-deception if there are feelings or outcomes that do not fit with them. 
There’s a sort of line in coaching which is about ‘you can do anything and you can 
achieve anything … a way of looking at the world that is about avoiding and 
denying the unpleasant bits. … something around not acknowledging the 
shadow…. (Linda) 
There is also a great deal of wider influences (power balance, organisational culture, 
current state of society) that were named by the participants as factors that may 
contribute to self-deception in coaches. The examples provided include the culture of 
blame in organisations which prevent people acknowledging a lack of skills or 
knowledge:  
You can’t afford to say that you don’t know. … so the coach may find it difficult to 
say actually this isn’t the right domain for me or I’m not the best person for that 
sector. (Linda) 
A much wider context that can also contribute to self-deception was described as a 
collective denial. Although this is not directly related to self-deception in coaching it 
could be seen as a background for self-deception on a wider scale and so a 
normalisation of it.  
We all know that there are major changes going on, say environmental 
changes that we need to deal with, but at the same time we are not behaving as 
if we know that. …there is a national or maybe even global, but certainly a 
western denial of the unsustainability of our lives, for example. This permeates 
everything and creates a context of self-deception. And because almost 
everybody else is also deceiving themselves this somehow makes it more ok. 
(Nick) 
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Focused influence in supervision  
Being practice-oriented, participants explored how self-deception in coaches could be 
approached in supervision. After considering the complex nature of self-deception 
and the spectrum of factors in the current state of coaching in wider society, the 
overall attitude towards this phenomenon is best described by one of them: 
How do we explore our self-deception and our shadow needs in a way that is 
loving and forgiving? We do need both: kind of sharpness of being able to see 
through our hopes, fears and self-editing and also the compassion to say: well, that 
is part of us being human.  
….Also something about not hunting it down because by hunting it down we’ll 
make it a thing rather than something that we are swimming in…. (Paul) 
The importance of supervision was generally acknowledged as the most suitable place 
to have a conversation about self-deception in coaches. On the one hand, it was seen 
as part of a normative function of supervision, which implies a necessity for the 
supervisor to point out self-deception that affects the quality of coaching. Bill, for 
example, said: 
I think that it really underlines the importance of solid supervision because this is 
where there’s a point that we need to be able to say as supervisors: I think you’re 
deceiving yourself. And I think that’s a pretty powerful thing to hear as well… 
(Bill) 
On the other hand, there was a view that it was the decision of the coach if they want 
the supervisor to be explicit about self-deception. For example, some participants 
thought the topic of self-deception should be discussed as part of the contract with a 
coach and whether or not it should be addressed in supervision. 
If the contract allowed for the possibility of looking at these sorts of issues, by 
definition it must do that, if it doesn’t require this then that may be not so 
important. (John) 
A much more unanimous view was expressed on the developmental function of 
supervision which implied that coaches needed an atmosphere of safety in order to 
feel increasingly capable to disclose any aspect of their work and thus to develop 
greater awareness and self-understanding. It was suggested that supervision should be 
seen as a ‘home for the shadow’ where the coach has permission to be imperfect and 
freely explore their self-deception.  
It has to create this safety and trust that enables the supervisee to self-disclose, 
which lends itself to awareness where self-deception may be coming in. … [This] 
will give them insight into anticipating and working with that with their clients … 
to enable their clients to learn to reduce self-deception. (Linda)  
In such an atmosphere, supervisor and coach are becoming partners in exploring this 
complex phenomenon which has more opportunities for seeing through self-
deceptions. In this spirit of equality, the change can be modelled by the supervisor. 
One of the participants noticed that a well-known approach in the supervision of 
identifying ‘parallel processes’ is a perfect way of modelling how to deal with self-
deception which is more powerful than ‘catching them unaware’: 
…by, if you like, getting to the pattern with them and being able to comment on the 
fact that you notice that that and this has happened to you, you are modelling how 
to get it right through getting it wrong. (Paul) 
 
Discussion 
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The analysis shows that findings are aligned with some theoretical perspectives more 
than with others. For example, the participants’ immediate reactions and examples of 
self-deception in coaches indicate a concern about self-deception rather than the 
potential value of self-deception as implied in the evolutionary approach. No affinity 
can be noticed with a fairly neutral stand towards self-deception that could be 
discerned from the postmodernist and neuroscientists’ perspectives. Although it is 
possible to argue that in some situations of coaching a degree of self-deception is 
beneficial, the participants’ stance was clearly aligned with the need to minimise self-
deception. 
In relation to two other perspectives from the five analysed in the literature, it 
is possible to observe that participants’ conceptualisation of self-deception is aligned 
with both the psychoanalytic and existential views. On the one hand they saw self-
deception as an outcome of fear and as a threat to self-image, which is an explanation 
of self-deception aligned with psychoanalysis. Accordingly, they advocate the 
importance of an accepting atmosphere in which individuals can relax and feel no 
need for defences. That is why the theme of ‘compassion’ is very prominent in the 
findings. On the other hand, in some descriptions of participants’ the need for a strong 
stand towards self-deception also comes through: ‘it is important for a coach to hear 
that they deceive themselves’. Some examples show that self-deception is happening 
‘for a gain’ and this could be challenged in supervision.  
It is interesting that this apparent tension can be explained from a different 
perspective indicated by the participants but not present in the general debates about 
the nature of self-deception. This position is developmental and can be seen as 
influenced by a number of adult development theories (e.g. Loevinger, 1994; Kegan, 
1982, 1994; Cook-Greuter, 1976). According to these theories there are patterns in the 
incremental development of various capacities of adults, such as cognitive, emotional, 
moral and many others. It could be argued that both approaches (psychoanalytic and 
existential) are appropriate as far as helping practices are concerned, but each works 
better for individuals at different stages of ego development (Loevinger, 1994; Cook-
Greuter, 1999; Adams and Fitch, 1982; Bachkirova, 2011). For example, when ego is 
more fragile, a slower and more supportive psychoanalytic approach to addressing 
self-deception may be an appropriate choice, but when the ego is stronger, the 
existential, more challenging approach might be useful. 
The findings also suggest that the postmodernist position on self-deception, 
although not resonating with the conceptualisation of the participants, has a certain 
value in emphasising the role of culture in what can be seen as self-deception on the 
individual level. Participants agreed that there are important contextual issues and 
associated discourses that apparently contribute to this phenomenon in individual 
coaches and need to be taken into consideration if a deeper understanding of self-
deception in coaches is to be gained. Such understanding can contribute not only to 
the quality of the personal and professional development of coaches through 
education, continuing professional development and supervision, but could also 
enrich the professional debates and inform some important decisions about the ethics 
and boundaries of coaching with other subject areas and professional activities. 
Another feature of this study, however exploratory, is indicating potential 
approaches to addressing self-deception in coaches. Although they are discussed in 
the context of coaching supervision the findings suggest useful ideas for other 
practitioners who might be interested in helping individuals to understand or minimise 
their self-deception. This is particularly important in the situation when little is 
written on this topic for applied purposes, apart from the literature in the 
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psychodynamic traditions. However, as the focus on self-deception in these traditions 
tends be skewed towards pathology, the ideas from coaching supervisors can widen 
the spectrum of means to influence self-deception. In addition to important conditions 
that help to make this work possible, new propositions include consideration of a 
specific contract that increases collaboration in addressing self-deception and even 
specific interventions such as modelling the way of dealing with self-deception by the 
supervisor.  
It is important to notice that participants, being experienced practitioners, did 
not underestimate the complexity of this phenomenon and no indication was given of 
unfounded hope for a huge success in eliminating self-deception even when there is 
an intention to minimise it. The tone of all contribution was quite sober with an 
appreciation that self-deception is a part of being human. However, as coaching and 
coaching supervision are developmental processes, a hint of cautious optimism was 
also present and well summarised by one of the participants: “That is part of the 
maturity of the coach, the degree of… not that you’re going to fall into traps less, but 
you notice it as you are going down the hole, you notice that you’re sliding down. It is 
not that you can really stop these things from happening, it’s just that you catch them 
quicker and sometimes in the moment…” (Paul) 
 
Conclusion 
This paper discussed the findings of a qualitative study that was aimed at exploring 
the concept of self-deception in coaches from the perspective of experienced coaching 
supervisors who also drew on their experiences as coaches. The model that was 
created as the result of this collaborative process sheds light on how self-deception 
can be manifested in the coaching context and what contextual factors can be at play. 
From the range of theoretical positions presented in the literature, the model of self-
deception in coaches seems to be most aligned with psychoanalytical and existential 
traditions. It offers a new developmental perspective on self-deception and contributes 
to the applied knowledge about self-deception with ideas for influencing it for 
developmental purposes and with the intention to improve the quality of coaching. 
As this study is exploratory it does not aim to make any definitive statement 
about the nature of self-deception in coaches, but may add to these debates from the 
pragmatic point of view. The limitations of the methodological approach used, such as 
the limited number of participants and the significant role of the researcher’s input, 
suggest the need for further studies. However, the study serves the purpose of the 
initial mapping of the issue for further research, which may ask questions such as how 
the changes in self-deception can be identified and if it is possible to differentiate 
types of self-deception according to the stages of development or level of experience. 
The findings can also inform practitioners: coaches and supervisors, and influence 
educational and training programmes if these programmes consider the development 
of self as the core of their philosophy.   
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